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While all societies are divided to one extent or another, the prefix “deeply” typically 
denotes a divided society in which national, ethnic, religious, linguistic or other 
divisions are severe enough to threaten the very nature or existence of the state. 
Clearly, this standard definition is extremely broad. Since it covers vastly different 
cases, it is normally refined for research purposes. In practice, scholars more or less 
consciously narrow the definition in ways that help them to identify and illuminate a 
specific class of cases.1 
 
The most common approach is to focus on cases where the main divisions in society 
are ethnic in kind and where those divisions engender civil violence.2 By contrast, our 
concern in this article is with societies that are seeking to manage their divisions by 
democratic means but where the consent of at least one major group or segment is 
still in question. While our approach also differs methodologically in that it is 
normative rather than comparative in kind, cases that illustrate our core concerns 
include Colombia, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and South Africa. Cases which do not (at 
least for now) fall within our focus include Belgium, Kashmir, Lebanon, Mindanao 
and Syria. 
 
In theory, the links between democracy and consent are obvious enough; democracy 
is rule by the people. But since the sheer scale of most modern democracies is such 
that the people cannot rule themselves directly, there has got to be a set of 
fundamental rules or constitutional settlement by which representatives govern on 
their behalf. The caveat is that a new constitutional settlement will be regarded as 
democratically legitimate only insofar as it has the consent of the people. 
 
At a general level, we take it that there is nothing particularly controversial about this 
understanding of the relationship between democracy and consent. Yet since in 
practice democracy and consent can take very different forms, scholars need to argue 
for their preferred conceptions. In this article, we argue that people should signal their 
consent for a new constitutional settlement through a plebiscite or referendum—that 
is, through a vote of the entire electorate intended to register the balance of support 
for the settlement.3 
 
Granted, referendums in deeply divided societies have a mixed track record. One can 
certainly point to relatively successful cases: the 1992 referendum on ending 
apartheid in South Africa or the 1998 referendum on power sharing in Northern 
Ireland. Yet one can also think of failures: the rejection of the UN-sponsored 2004 
                                                 
1 For a discussion, see Adrian Guelke, Politics in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
esp. chap. 2. 
2 See e.g. Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985). 
3 While in Canada plebiscites are generally non-binding on governments, and referendums are, this 
terminological distinction is not followed in all countries. Moreover, the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably (in view, in part, of the occasional ambiguity as to whether a public vote is effectively 
binding). There is also tremendous further diversity in the forms and contexts of referendums—such as 
mandate, citizen-initiated, mutual-veto, secession, accession and withdrawal referendums. Most of 
these referendum variations are not directly germane to this article. 
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Anan Plan for reunifying Cyprus or, more recently, the rejection of a peace deal 
between the Colombian government and FARC guerrillas in 2016. It is not always 
easy to say what makes the difference from case to case or, indeed, to predict what 
might happen next. However, the assumption on which this article rests is that the 
quality of the deliberation that occurs during the course of the referendum is likely to 
have an important bearing on the referendum’s chances of success—that is, on its 
chances of generating democratic consent for a new constitutional settlement. 
 
Deliberation is a feature of all conceptions of democracy, including competitive party 
models.4 Yet the conception of democracy that informs our thinking in this article is 
“deliberative democracy” itself.5 As the name suggests, deliberative democracy is a 
conception of democracy that reserves a central place for public reasoning about 
important matters of law and public policy. Importantly, the members of such a 
democracy do not seek to impose their competing views one another, for example, 
through the strategic force of numbers or simple brute force. Rather, each side seeks 
to convince the other that the better arguments are on its side. They do so because, on 
a deliberative view, “outcomes are legitimate if and only if they could be the object of 
a free and reasoned agreement among equals.”6  
 
There are many reasons to value deliberative democracy.7 Yet in the sorts of deeply 
divided society with which we are concerned in this article, one reason stands out as 
especially pressing. Constitutional settlements usually require major compromises—
typically, each side will have to make painful concessions to the other’s constitutional 
vision of the state. For example, the majority may have to accept that power will be 
shared, while, for its part, the minority may have to give up its claim to independent 
statehood. As a consequence, constitutional settlements usually require considerable 
forbearance—typically, each party to the compromise will have to patiently endure 
the criticisms others level at it for making concessions. More precisely, in deeply 
divided societies, the moderates who negotiate a settlement must endure the criticisms 
levelled at them from the extremes. Yet insofar as moderates are able to explain to 
voters during the course of the referendum why they acted as they did—why 
moderation served their purposes better than extremism—the settlement that they 
reach may have a better chance of taking root and enduring. 
 
Of course, moderation is a long-established theme in the literature on deeply divided 
societies. For example, Donald Horowitz argues that the Alternative Vote electoral 
system, and in particular the preferential nature of its ballot, may encourage political 
parties from one group or segment to look for votes from another. Since lower-order 
preferences may make all the difference between winning and losing seats, parties 
have a real incentive to moderate their claims in the hope of broadening their appeal.8 
                                                 
4 Albert Weale, Democracy (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999) 37. 
5 For a useful introduction, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) ch 1. 
6 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in Philip Pettit & Alan P Hamlin, eds, The 
Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 17 at 22. 
7 For a list of goods that deliberation is thought to secure, see Jonathan W Kuyper, “The Instrumental 
Value of Deliberative Democracy – Or, Do We Have Good Reasons to be Deliberative Democrats?” 
14:1 J of Public Deliberation 1. 
8 Horowitz, supra note 2; Donald L Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering 
in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 189. 
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Yet while we agree that electoral systems can be designed to encourage moderation, 
what is novel or distinctive about our approach is its emphasis on deliberation. With 
specific reference to the referendum, we favour not just electoral engineering, but 
deliberative electoral engineering. 
 
Admittedly, the idea of a deliberative referendum—a referendum purposefully 
designed with deliberative principles in mind—is not new.9 Nor is the idea of 
applying deliberative democracy to divided societies.10 Yet to date, very little has 
been written on the application of the notion of a deliberative referendum to deeply 
divided societies.11 Even less—if anything at all—has been written about the idea of 
using the deliberative referendum as a driver of moderation in the context of 
generating popular consent for a new constitutional settlement. 
 
Before proceeding with this argument, one obvious practical objection needs to be 
confronted. On the face of it, deeply divided societies would seem to be infertile 
ground for deliberation. In deliberation, each party seeks to convince the other that the 
better arguments are on its side. To that end, they invoke considerations and exchange 
reasons in an endeavour to arrive at an agreed judgement or a shared view.12 Yet in a 
deeply divided society, it may be difficult even to get people on opposing sides in the 
same room. And if they do meet, they may not really deliberate: they may fail to listen 
to one another with an open mind or reflect seriously on what others have to say. 
Since trust is likely to be low, they may simply regard one another’s reasons as 
insincere cover for sectional interests. As O’Leary pointedly remarks, “those who 
embrace a politics of deliberative democracy as the prescription for conflict need 
reminding that deliberation takes place in languages, dialects, accents and ethnically 
toned voices and that it is not possible to create ‘ideal speech situations’.”13 There 
may, for instance, be “enclave deliberation,” in which most of the discussion occurs 
among people on the same side. Enclave deliberation is likely only to deepen the lines 
of division, as Sunstein’s work on polarisation suggests.14 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Stephen Tierney, “Using Electoral Law to Construct a Deliberative Referendum: Moving 
Beyond the Democratic Paradox” (2013) 12:4 Election LJ 508. 
10 For an overview, see Ian O’Flynn and Didier Caluwaerts, “Deliberation and Divided Societies,” in 
André Bächtiger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark Warren, eds, Oxford Handbook of 
Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 742. 
11 Two of the few examples are: Ron Levy, Amelia Simpson, Ian O’Flynn & Georgina Flaherty, 
“Designing Referendums for Peacemaking: The Case of Bougainville” (2018) 33:2 Australasian 
Parliamentary Rev 6; Ron Levy, “Shotgun Referendums: Popular Deliberation and Constitutional 
Settlement in Conflict Societies” (2018) 41:3 Melbourne U L Rev 1237. 
12 David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice” (1992) 40:1 Political Studies 54 at 55; 
Michael A Neblo, Deliberative Democracy Between Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 92.  
13 Brendan O’Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments” in 
Noel Sid, ed, From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided 
Societies (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005) 3 at 10. 
14 Cass R Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization” (2002) 10:2 J of Political Philosophy 175. In 
conflict societies, concerns about security will typically drive people to live within their own 
communities, to marry within their own traditions, to send their children to segregated schools and so 
forth. From within these enclaves, stereotyping assumptions and prejudicial social comparisons—based 
on distinctions both real and imagined, and both large and trivial—often flourish: Michael Billig & 
Henri Tajfel, “Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour” (1973) 3:1 European J of 
Political Research 27. Ordinary people are frequently prevented from knowing or understanding the 
salience of others’ histories and values, and hence from developing any sense of empathy for them: 
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For analysts such as O’Leary, democracy in deeply divided societies is best handled 
by political leaders or other elites15 who are both willing to take tough decisions and 
strong enough to bring their supporters along with them in implementing those 
decisions.16 Yet if political leaders, who also speak “in languages, dialects, accents 
and ethnically toned voices,” can negotiate within appropriately structured 
institutions, why can’t ordinary people deliberate, also within appropriately structured 
institutions?  
 
As we indicated above, the assumption on which this paper rests is that deliberation 
matters to a referendum’s chances of success. More specifically, a peace referendum 
designed with deliberative principles in mind may stand a better chance than one that 
is not of generating popular consent for a new constitutional settlement. Crucially, 
however, this implies that the quality of the deliberation that takes place during the 
course of a referendum campaign will itself be affected by the design of the 
referendum. Put another way, while deliberative democracy may guide the design of 
the referendum, the referendum should in turn make meaningful deliberation possible. 
It will provide an institutional framework within which deliberation can occur. As 
Cohen puts it, the members of a deliberative democracy share “a commitment to co-
ordinating their activities within institutions that make deliberation possible and 
according to norms that they arrive at through their deliberation.”17 Theory and 
practice should be seen as mutually implicating. 
 
To explore these considerations in greater detail, we proceed as follows. In the first 
section, we offer three (inter-related) arguments in support of the use of referendums 
in deeply divided societies. First, since constitutional settlements have far reaching 
implications—implications that may extend to almost every corner of daily life—it 
seems only right or just to give ordinary people a direct say. Secondly, in principle, 
referendums encourage ordinary people to take a broader or more encompassing view 
of political life. They may therefore encourage people to focus less on what divides 
them and more on what they share. Thirdly, insofar as referendums change the 
character of politics in this way, they may make it easier for moderates to compromise 
across deep divides. 
 
                                                 
Michael E Morrell, in Empathy and democracy: feeling, thinking, and deliberation (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). For instance, the existence of separate linguistic, 
educational, religious and media institutions and norms in Lebanon meant that “powerful internal 
social barriers impeded contact between the communities”: John Coakley, “Ethnic Conflict Resolution: 
Routes Towards Settlement” (2009) 15:3–4 Nationalism and Ethnic politics 462 at 467. 
15 On our definition, these leaders or elites might include governmental insiders (elected or appointed 
legislative, executive and judicial members) or social elites (media commentators and organisations; 
business leaders; and influential voices purporting to speak for religious, ethnic, tribal or other identity 
groups). 
16 That elected or appointed elites are best positioned to lead successful processes of peacemaking is a 
common assumption in the literature: see e.g. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: 
Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of California Press, 1975); O’Leary, supra 
note 14. As will become clear, we think this assumption is not always correct. Elites may, for instance, 
have greater difficulty than non-elites at engaging in flexible, non-partisan deliberation, or in using new 
information to challenge (rather than reconfirm) presuppositions: see e.g. Dan M Kahan, “Ideology, 
Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection” (2012) 8 Judgment and Decision Making 407 at 416–
418. 
17 Cohen, supra note 6, at 21. 
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In the second section, we then make the claim that referendums will produce desirable 
consequences of this sort only if the quality of deliberation that takes place during the 
course of the referendum campaign is sufficiently high. As already indicated, we 
acknowledge that the quality of deliberation will itself be affected by the way in 
which the referendum is designed or conducted. Moreover, we accept that a 
comprehensive analysis would need to focus on a broad range of (background) social, 
cultural and institutional variables. However, for the purposes of illustration, we focus 
in this second section on two main ways in which referendums in deeply divided 
societies may undermine deliberation, namely the majoritarian problem and the 
inflexibility problem.  
 
In the third and final section, we consider how a referendum might be organised so as 
to increase the prospects for deliberation and hence to improve the referendum’s 
chances of success. In particular, we consider three overlapping themes or issues: (1) 
timing, (2) inclusion and (3) preference voting. Insofar as these issues can be 
successfully addressed, we will have strong—or at least stronger—grounds for 
thinking that referendums can have a positive role to play in generating consent for a 
new democratic constitutional settlement. 
 
Why hold referendums in deeply divided societies?  
 
In a democracy, the people are the ultimate source of political authority.18 As such, 
governments merely hold that authority in trust and depend for their legitimacy on the 
consent of the governed. This democratic understanding of the idea of political 
legitimacy has been defended by major figures in the history of political thought such 
as Locke and Rousseau.19 Yet what is easy to overlook is that this understanding can 
apply as much to deeply divided societies as it does to more mature democratic 
systems. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that it applies even more. In an effective 
democracy, the consent of the governed can be largely taken for granted.20 Yet in a 
deeply divided society that is seeking to manage its divisions through democratic 
means, the consent of the governed cannot simply be assumed. On the contrary, the 
experience of deep division is often such that at least one major group or segment of 
the society is likely to have withdrawn is consent and will therefore need to be 
persuaded to grant its consent anew to any future constitutional settlement.. 
 
There are different institutional means of asking ordinary people for their consent. 
Traditionally, the approach favoured by comparative scholars has been to hold a 
general election or an election to a constitutional convention. Once elected, the 
leaders of the different groups or segments can then be charged both with agreeing a 
new democratic settlement and with convincing their supporters to accept it.21 As we 
                                                 
18 Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy” in Benhabib Seyla, ed, 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996) 96.  
19 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), book 2; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses, trans. G.D.H. 
Cole (London: Everyman’s Library, 1993). 
20 John Petrov Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd ed (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968) 7; cf Anthony Harold Birch, Representation (New York: Praeger, 1972) 33.  
21 See e.g. Lijphart, supra note 17; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative 
Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for 
 
 6 
 
indicated in our introductory remarks, this approach is essentially elitist: while the 
consent of ordinary people has got to be secured, less is more.22 Ordinary people 
should be asked for their consent, but the real business of agreeing a new 
constitutional settlement and ensuring that it beds down should be left to their elected 
leaders. If, over the course of time, ordinary people are unhappy with how their 
leaders have performed, they can always vote them out of office at the next election. 
 
A different approach to asking ordinary people for their consent is the referendum. 
Indeed, as an empirical matter, referendums are on the rise around the world, 
including in deeply divided societies.23 Those who favour the traditional approach that 
we have just described tend to be extremely wary of referendums. For example, Ben 
Reilly argues that referendums “should not be used in divided societies which are 
being asked to make stark choices about their future. In such cases, where a bare 
majority ‘50 per cent plus one’ is the threshold for victory or defeat, the plebiscite is a 
zero-sum game … that will play into the hands of hardliners”.24 We think that this is 
an important objection—one that is firmly grounded in the realities of deep division. 
Yet before we confront this and other related objections, we first present three 
theoretical reasons in support of using referendums. 
 
 
1. The reach of peace agreements 
 
Constitutional settlements typically cover many issues besides the fundamental rules 
of government—for example, land rights, the use of minority languages, the return of 
refugees, amnesties for former paramilitaries, the allocation of natural resources, 
education and health, employment opportunities, and so forth. The reach and gravity 
of these matters suggest that, as a matter of basic political principle, ordinary people 
should have their say over them directly. Otherwise, a contradiction arises if the effort 
to manage deep divisions democratically occurs without appreciable democratic 
participation.25 Of course, this assumes that ordinary people will cast their vote 
wisely—that they will reflect seriously on the issues and strive to offer a considered 
                                                 
Divided Societies” (2004) 15:2 J of Democracy 96; Horowitz, supra note 2; Donald L Horowitz, 
“Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers” (2003) 14:4 J of Democracy 115; O’Leary, supra 
note 14; Ben Reilly, “Democratic Validation” in John Darby & Roger MacGinty, eds, Contemporary 
Peace Making: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) 174; cf. Joanne 
McEvoy, “Letting ‘the people(s)’ Decide: Peace Referendums and Power-Sharing Settlements” (2018) 
25:5 Democratization 864 
22 The obvious theoretical touchstone for elitist views of this sort is Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper 1942). 
23 For a typology and global overview of ethno-national referendums, see Matt Qvortrup, “The History 
of Ethno-National Referendums 1791–2011” (2012) 18:1 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 129 at 150; 
see also Matt Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2014). For a typology and global overview of sovereignty referendums, see Fernando Mendez & 
Micha Germann, “Contested Sovereignty: Mapping Referendums on Sovereignty over Time and 
Space” (2018) 48:1 British J of Political Science 141 at 165. 
24 Reilly, supra note 24 at 183.  
25 See similarly Robert Post, “Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review” (1998) 86 
California Law Review 429. On popular “deliberative capacity” as an essential component of 
democratisation processes, see John Dryzek, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building” 
(2009) 42:11 Comparative Political Studies 1379. 
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view—which brings us to a second broad reason for thinking that referendums are a 
commendable vehicle of popular participation in deeply divided societies.  
 
2. The development of a more encompassing point of view 
 
It is often said that the nature of democracy is such that it requires members to 
develop a more mature sense of responsibility for their actions, including a greater 
willingness to reflect on and take into account the consequences of those actions for 
others.26 As part of that, members must be willing to carry their fair share of the 
burdens of democratic life, rather than simply seeking to reap its rewards for 
themselves. Most obviously, they must pay their taxes honestly and, more generally, 
observe the law. They must also find it within themselves to be civil to one another, 
particularly when they disagree.27 In less prosaic terms, they must be motivated to do 
for themselves what a Philosopher King (or at least a benevolent dictator) might do on 
their behalf and trust that others will be similarly motivated. 
 
There are potentially many ways in which this sort of disposition might be cultivated 
and enlarged. But political theorists have long argued that participation has a crucial 
role to play. Famously, J.S. Mill argued that when an ordinary person participates in 
political life, he (or she) is 
 
called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in 
case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, 
at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence 
the common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work 
minds more familiarised than his own with these ideas and operations, whose 
study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his 
feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and 
whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit.28 
 
So described, political participation obliges us to take a broader or more 
encompassing view of public issues. The psychological mechanism at work here is 
publicity: in a public forum, naked appeals to one’s own special interests may well 
prove socially unacceptable. Hence, participants have a real incentive to “dilute” their 
stated position. But, having made that move, they will then be subject to a 
“consistency constraint”: if they deviate from the position when it ceases to be to their 
advantage, they will be viewed as opportunistic.29 On the face of it, this might be 
taken to suggest that political participation is little more than an exercise in duplicity 
or hypocrisy. Yet over time, the hope is that political participation may perceptibly 
change our underlying motivations and shift them in a more public spirited direction. 
 
                                                 
26 Albert Weale, Democratic Citizenship and the European Union (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2005) at 26. 
27 Brian Barry, “Self-Government Revisited” in David Miller & Larry Siedentop, eds, The Nature of 
Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 121 at 141–142; Charles Taylor, “The 
Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion” (1998) 9:4 J of Democracy 143 at 144. 
28 John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government” in John Gray, ed, John Stuart 
Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 203 at 255. 
29 Jon Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution Making” in Jon Elster, ed, Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 97 at 102. 
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The implications for deeply divided societies seeking to manage their divisions by 
democratic means must be obvious. If a new democratic settlement is to take hold and 
deepen, the different segments of society must learn to divide less and share more. 
Insofar as political participation educates the mind and changes political dispositions, 
it may help their respective members to gain a more rounded appreciation of the 
various ways in which their lives are intertwined. The thinking here is clearly 
aspirational. But aspirations can often make all the difference in societies struggling 
to overcome deep divisions. It should not be forgotten that very many societies—such 
as those that above we called “effective,” but that in the past were still developing or 
divided—have met these aspirations. An open question remains what processes or 
other factors can most assist them to do so. 
 
Again, while popular participation can take many forms, there is reason to think that 
referendums may have a signal role to play in this particular respect. In theory, they 
can empower ordinary people by giving them a direct say on important political 
decisions, which may in turn encourage them to pay greater attention to the arguments 
of others. In this vein, A.V. Dicey, another famous British constitutional theorist, 
argued that the political education gained from participating in a referendum 
surpasses the education gained from participating in a general election—since 
elections offer only an indirect opportunity to influence important matters of law and 
public policy, the incentive to debate with others is lower than in a referendum where 
the debate concludes in a decisive vote.30 Dicey did not think that every issue could or 
should be decided by referendum or that, more generally, direct democracy could 
supplant representative government. But he did think that, when used to decide a 
major constitutional issue, referendums could provide ordinary people with a real 
incentive to learn about the issues and hence to cast a more informed vote.  
 
3. Fostering moderation, facilitating compromise 
 
The idea that referendums can have an educative, perspective-broadening role 
overlaps with a third reason for thinking that referendums have something valuable to 
contribute. While there is little doubt that some form of elite role in constitutional 
negotiations will be required, there is a great deal of doubt about what to do with the 
many practical—or “real world”—problems that such roles bring. Of those problems, 
one seems especially relevant in the present context: intra-group outbidding, a 
ubiquitous problem in the sorts of society with which we are concerned.31 
 
In deeply divided societies that hold democratic votes, voting typically breaks down 
along group lines.32 However, the fact that each group votes for its own political 
parties makes it difficult for moderates to compromise across group lines. Doing so 
may leave them open to charges of betrayal and hence to being electorally undercut 
by hardline rivals from within their own group. Knowing this to be the case, 
                                                 
30A.V. Dicey, “The Referendum and Its Critics” (1910) Q Review 212 at 507–508.; see Mads 
Qvortrup, A comparative study of referendums: government by the people, 2nd ed (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005) at 54–55 for a discussion. 
31 Brian Barry, “Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy” (1975) 5:4 
British J of Political Science 477 at 505. 
32 John Garry, “Consociationalism and Its Critics: Evidence From the Historic Northern Ireland 
Assembly Election 2007” (2009) 28:3 Electoral Studies 458. 
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moderates are themselves forced to present their views and policies in more extreme 
terms. But having publicly done so, it can be very difficult for them to take a more 
conciliatory approach later on, once they have been returned to power.33  
 
The “outbidding thesis” holds that as a result of these electoral dynamics, a society as 
a whole will become increasingly polarised or divided. Yet what often goes unsaid (or 
perhaps unnoticed) is that outbidding can occur only if ordinary people are susceptible 
to charges of betrayal. More precisely, outbidding can happen only if ordinary people 
generally like their politics as extreme as possible (e.g., because they think that others 
will be more fearful of them and hence more likely to capitulate) or because they are 
so fearful of what others might do to them that hardliners or extremists can easily tap 
into their insecurities (e.g., because they are in a minority and feel that they might be 
over-run). Either way, the prospects for managing their divisions democratically can 
be seriously undermined.  
 
Crucially, insofar as referendums encourage ordinary people to learn more and think 
deeper about the issues—to take a more encompassing view, as we put it above—
referendums may make it harder for hardliners or extremists to play on the fears and 
insecurities of group members. That is, they may reduce the space or scope for 
outbidding. This is not as fanciful as it seems. On the contrary, there is empirical 
evidence to suggest that referendums may reduce the significance of long-standing 
divisions, with different social and political cleavages coming to the fore.34 Insofar as 
this is the case, referendums can give some advantage to moderates, by enabling them 
to do something for which they ordinarily get punished at the polls, that is, 
compromise across ethnic lines.35 Naturally, much will depend on how frequently 
referendums are held, the type of question that is put to the vote, and a myriad of 
other variables. But the point remains that, in principle, referendums can have an 
important role to play in building peace and fostering democracy in deeply divided 
societies.  
 
Two big problems with referendums 
 
There is, therefore, reason to think that, referendums can have a number of desirable 
consequences: they may encourage ordinary people to adopt a broader view and they 
may make it easier for elites to compromise across deep divides. As such, 
referendums can serve as an instrument of democracy. 
 
At the same time, however, much will depend on how the referendum is conducted 
and, in particular, on the quality of the deliberation that occurs during the course of 
the referendum campaign. Deliberation requires people to give reasons for their 
                                                 
33 Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?, supra note 8 at 177–196; Cathy Gormley-Heenan & Roger 
Macginty, “Ethnic Outbidding and Party Modernization: Understanding the Democratic Unionist 
Party’s Electoral Success in the Post-Agreement Environment” (2008) 7:1 Ethnopolitics 43; cf Paul 
Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans & Brendan O’Leary, “Extremist Outbidding in Ethnic Party Systems is Not 
Inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland” (2009) 57:2 Political Studies 397. 
34 Hanspeter Kriesi & Alexandre H Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a 
Consensus Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 62–63. 
35 Cf Arthur Lupia & Richard Johnston, “Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite 
Maneuvers in Referendums” in Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin, eds, Referendum Democracy: 
Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 
191 at 203–207. 
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arguments. It also requires them to assess their own and others’ reasons with an open 
mind and to weigh them on their merits. Yet while deliberative democracy is 
obviously demanding, in its absence it would be hard to see how a more 
encompassing point of view might emerge or how conditions for moderation might be 
fostered and sustained. In the absence of moderation, one or more segment of society 
is likely to withhold its consent. 
 
At the same time, it is also reasonable to assume that ordinary people will not 
deliberate well unless the referendum process is itself consciously designed to 
encourage them to do so. As Cohen notes,  
 
Institutions in a deliberative democracy do not serve simply to implement the 
results of deliberation, as though free deliberation could proceed in the 
absence of appropriate institutions. Neither the commitment to nor the 
capacity for arriving at deliberative decisions is something that we can simply 
assume to obtain independent from the proper ordering of institutions.36  
 
Indeed, given the propensity for outbidding characteristic of deeply divided societies, 
it is entirely plausible that referendums conducted without institutional support for 
deliberation might only perpetuate or intensify divisions, and stymie the prospects for 
democratic settlement. 
 
That means, of course, that a deliberative peace referendum will be a highly complex 
institutional entity. What is more, the referendum will itself be affected by the broader 
institutional setting in which it is located, as well as by the broader background 
culture against which it take place. Given the enormous number of possible variables 
at play here, there is always going to be plenty of room for disagreement. For 
example, Parkinson argues that it would be wrong to think that referendums in 
Switzerland lead to compromise and consensus, since those consequences are actually 
caused by other features of the Swiss political system. As he explains, the Swiss 
political system is such that the federal government is effectively forced “to work 
with the different parties, cantons and officially recognised pressure groups (the 
Verbände) to mould actions that already have broad support, often deliberately to 
head off initiative action.”37 Very often, that is, the referendum question is addressed 
even before it can be put to the test. By contrast, Kriesi and Trechsel argue that the 
referendum is a truly “system formative” device, shaping almost every other aspect of 
the Swiss political system. For example, they argue that the optional referendum in 
particular “hangs like a sword of Damocles over the whole legislative process, 
potentially ruining entire bills. Consequently, institutional mechanisms have 
developed, both formally and informally, to reduce this risk, transforming Swiss 
democracy into a negotiation democracy.”38  
 
Whatever one might make of this sort of disagreement, the basic lesson should be 
clear: if we want the referendum to play its part in generating consent for a new 
                                                 
36 Cohen, supra note 6 at 26. 
37 John Parkinson, “Deliberative Democracy and Referendums” in Helen Margetts, Keith M Dowding 
& James Hughes, eds, Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement and Institutions (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001) 131 at 136-137. 
38 Kriesi & Trechsel, supra note 40 at 58. See also Adrian Vatter, “Consensus and Direct Democracy: 
Conceptual and Empirical Linkages” (2000) 38:2 European J of Political Research 171 at 185. 
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democratic settlement, then it has to be matched by an extensive range of 
complementary institutions. Naturally, this is an enormous challenge that would need 
to be addressed from multiple angles and at multiple levels, macro, meso and micro. 
Yet for present purposes, it will suffice to narrow the scope of investigation, 
beginning with some reflections on the ways in which referendums can inhibit the 
very deliberation upon which they depend for their success. Once we understand the 
ways in which things can go wrong, we can then, in the final section of this article, 
look at ways in which referendums might be instituted so that they produce higher 
quality deliberation and hence, potentially, better quality results. 
 
In what follows, we discuss two main ways in which referendums in deeply divided 
societies may undermine deliberation, namely the majoritarian problem and the 
inflexibility problem.  
 
1. The majoritarian problem 
 
In a referendum, voters are usually asked a single question to which they are invited 
to answer “yes” or “no.” Whichever side gets the most votes wins. That may be 
perfectly fine for societies with lots of floating voters: those in the majority today may 
find themselves in the minority tomorrow. But in deeply divided societies, the fact 
that people typically vote along group lines means that shifting majorities and shifting 
minorities are more the exception than the rule.39 Under such conditions, the larger 
groups in society may have no particular incentive to deliberate with the smaller, just 
as the smaller groups in society may feel that their views and opinions count for little 
or nothing in the decision that results—leading at least one prominent deliberative 
theorist to conclude that, so construed, referendums are “antithetical to the spirit of 
deliberation.”40 
 
Of course, the exact point at which a majority threshold is set may make a significant 
difference. For example, in a deeply divided society in which group A comprises 60 
per cent of the population and group B comprises 40 per cent of the population, 
simple majority rule may mean that deliberation will occur only if the majority 
chooses to engage as a matter of goodwill. However, if the majority threshold is 
instead set at 70 per cent, group A may have a real incentive to deliberate with group 
B in the hope of agreeing a workable compromise proposal. Changing the threshold 
may therefore encourage deliberation. Yet even here, group A may need only to 
appeal to, or deliberate with, a small segment of group B to win an overall majority. 
Worryingly, the views and opinions of that small segment may not be terribly 
representative of the group as a whole, if indeed they are representative at all.41 
 
                                                 
39 Reilly, supra note 24 at 180. In slightly more technical language, since group cleavages tend to 
“coincide” rather than “cross cut,” the risk of permanent majorities and permanent majorities is ever 
present (that is, in the absence of institutional adjustments and accommodations). 
40 Simone Chambers, “Constitutional Referendums and Democratic Deliberation” in Matthew 
Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin, eds, Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in 
Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2001) 231 at 242. 
41 See David Russell & Nadim Shehadi, “Power Sharing and National Reconciliation: The Case of 
Lebanon” in Ian O’Flynn & David Russell, eds, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic 
Conflicts (London: Pluto Press, 2005) 138 at 141. 
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Any institutional mechanism that simply condemned a group to the status of a 
permanent minority would surely do little to advance the cause of democracy or 
consent. Rather than encouraging deliberation, referendums might instead encourage 
larger groups to ignore or discount the views of smaller groups, and continue doing so 
once the referendum has returned its verdict. That would be undemocratic. After all, 
the political equality of democracy “supposes that the weaker members of a political 
community are entitled to the same concern and respect of their government as the 
more powerful members have secured for themselves.”42 A minority group that felt its 
views were simply discounted, irrespective of merit, would almost certainly withhold 
its consent. In the worst scenario, it might resort to violence (though, of course, one 
can never be sure how any given group might react).  
 
Clearly, then, there is a real danger that referendums will undermine deliberation. As 
Simone Chambers puts it, referendums “invest so much in numbers rather than in 
arguments that it is hard for the losing side not to read the outcome as ‘might makes 
right’.”43 Insofar as referendums really do raise the spectre of majority tyranny, the 
prospects for deliberation will be correspondingly reduced—as will the chances of 
generating popular consent for a new constitutional settlement, of changing or 
channelling the attitudes and dispositions of ordinary people in a more public spirited 
direction, and of making it easier for political elites to compromise across the group 
lines.  
 
Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that many prominent comparative 
scholars have concluded that the referendum is a deeply problematic means of 
building peace or of advancing democracy,44 preferring instead to focus their 
attentions on the question of how best to arrange for power sharing between political 
elites from rival groups .45 As Reilly argues, unlike ordinary elections, in which an 
issue may be debated and reconsidered every few years, decisions made by 
referendum can be very hard to change—with referendums, there “are no second 
chances, no face-saving ways to sugar-coat the pill and no creative options such as 
power-sharing arrangements that build in some voice for the losers. Losers, in such 
circumstances, often perceive themselves to be losers for ever”.46 
 
2. The inflexibility problem 
 
There would be little point in thinking about the relationship between referendums 
and deliberation in deeply divided societies unless there was a real chance that 
deliberation might make a positive difference. In the deliberative literature, the point 
is often made that deliberation can, among other things, promote mutual 
understanding, encourage civic mindedness, and foster faith in the democratic 
                                                 
42 Ronald Dworkin, “Taking Rights Seriously” in Robert E Goodin & Philip Pettit, eds, Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 289 at 297. 
43 Chambers, supra note 46 at 243–244. 
44 See e.g. Giovanni Sartori, Comparative constitutional engineering : an inquiry into structures, 
incentives and outcomes, 2nd ed (Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1997) at 165. 
45 See e.g. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, supra note 24. 
46 Reilly, supra note 24 at 180. 
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process.47 In other words, deliberation can promote precisely the sort of encompassing 
point of view that democratisation is said to require. 
 
The idea of promoting a more encompassing point of view sits best with a 
constructivist view of group identity.48 On such a view, the fact that our identities are 
socially constructed means that they can be questioned, reaffirmed, revised or even 
changed. It also means that they can be more or less politically salient, depending on 
the circumstances, including our relationships with others.49 For instance, on a 
constructivist view, the term “Serb” refers not to a single entity but to a range of 
associations and institutions—including the Orthodox Church, political parties, 
women’s group, sporting associations, and so forth. These different institutions offer a 
range of definitions of what being “Serbian” means, and act in a range of ways to 
pursue those definitions, often in competition with one another. How this competition 
plays itself out will depend on institutional and other contexts—Kosovo Serbs, for 
example, are not the same as Serbs in the remainder of Serbia. But whatever the 
context, group identity is not a property or a set of essential attributes that all Serbs 
must inevitably possess, but a relationship that Serbs establish and re-establish among 
themselves and between themselves and others over the course of time. 
 
Constructivists recognise that under some circumstances, especially those marked by 
deep social and political divisions, group identities can become extremely durable: 
once crystallised, they can be very hard to reconstruct.50 Nevertheless, the fact that 
group or segmental identities are never simply “given” means that in principle change 
is always possible. With this latter thought in mind, many scholars argue that a 
judiciously designed set of political institutions can shift how people perceive their 
identities in more benign directions—for instance, by shifting them from “antagonism 
to agonism,” in Chantal Mouffe’s phrase.51 
 
However, even if one were to accept that institutions can potentially alter the ways in 
which people perceive their identities, one might nevertheless think that referendums 
are simply far too blunt or reductive an instrument for this purpose. Roger MacGinty 
advances a sustained argument of this latter sort, focusing in particular on the 
possibility of a constitutional referendum on whether Northern Ireland should remain 
part of the United Kingdom or become part of a re-united Ireland.52 According to 
                                                 
47 See Kuyper, supra note 7. 
48 Kanchan Chandra, “What is Ethnic Identify and What Does it Matter?” (2006) 9:1 Annual Rev of 
Political Science 397; Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics” (2001) 
12:1 Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 7; cf Donald L Horowitz, 
“Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers” (2003) 14:4 J of Democracy 115 at 115.  
49 Michael R James, “The Political Ontology of Race” (2012) 44:1 Polity 106. 
50 Henry E Hale, “Explaining Ethnicity” (2004) 37:4 Comparative Political Studies 458. 
51 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” (1999) 66:3 Social Research 
745 at 755 
52 Under paragraph 1 of the Northern Ireland Act (1998), the UK Parliament guaranteed in law that if a 
referendum on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland returned a result in favour of a united 
Ireland, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would be required to bring proposals to Parliament 
to give effect to that wish. Under Schedule 1, Paragraph 2, the Secretary of State may call such as 
referendum “if at any time it appears likely to him [or her] that a majority of those voting would 
express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a 
united Ireland.”; Roger MacGinty, “Constitutional referendums and ethnonational conflict: the case of 
Northern Ireland” (2003) 9:2 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1. 
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MacGinty, in-or-out referendums of this sort reduce complex constitutional issues to a 
crude binary choice. Importantly, while the majoritarian objection discussed above 
turns on the fact that, when faced with a choice between voting “yes” or voting “no,” 
minorities may persistently find themselves on the losing side, the objection here 
turns on the claim that minorities are not the only potential losers—as a matter of fact, 
everyone in society stands to lose.53  
 
MacGinty claims that data from the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey “suggests 
pluralities rather than majorities in constitutional preferences, and so points towards 
the inability of a constitutional referendum to produce a definitive outcome”.54 The 
latest version of the survey confirms MacGinty’s claim.55  
 
In Northern Ireland, Protestants make up 48 per cent of the population while Catholics 
make up 45 per cent.56 Traditionally, “Protestant” is treated as shorthand for British 
unionist and “Catholic” as shorthand for Irish Nationalist. However, when asked, 
“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Unionist, a Nationalist or 
neither?,” 32 per cent responded “Unionist,” 21 per cent responded “Nationalist,” 
while 45 per cent responded “neither.”57 Just as interestingly, when asked about 
Northern Ireland’s long-term constitutional status, 14 per cent said that they thought it 
should remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule, 47 per cent with devolved 
government, 20 per cent said that the thought it should re-unify with the rest of 
Ireland, while 3 per cent thought it should be an independent state.58 However, when 
asked how they would vote in a referendum “about whether Northern Ireland should 
leave the UK and unite with the Republic of Ireland,” 55 per cent said they would 
vote for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, 22 per cent said that they would 
vote for Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic of Ireland.59 Of the 55 per cent 
who said they would vote for Northern Ireland to remain, 85 per cent self-identified as 
protestant—again, a marker for British unionism. 
 
                                                 
53 In a recent paper on referendums in deeply divided societies, McEvoy argues that simple majority 
rule need not be a hindrance to peace and democracy if the agreement on which people are being asked 
to vote already has majority support within each of the main conflicting groups. McEvoy, supra note 
24. However, for that argument to hold, the agreement has to be widely viewed as win-win. In the 
language of negotiation theory, it has to be an “integrative” rather than a “distributive” solution. Not all 
questions admit of integrative solutions, especially binary questions of the sort that MacGinty is 
concerned with. It is also the case that integrative solutions are notoriously difficult to achieve in 
deeply divided societies; among other things, they require a level of trust or credible commitment that 
is all too often lacking. See David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict” (1996) 21: 2 International Security 41. However, one way to think 
about the argument of this paper is in terms of the idea that, where a constitutional settlement can in 
principle be framed as an integrative solution, deliberation might prove decisive—it might be the 
catalyst for a better agreement. See Mark E Warren & Jane Mansbridge, “Deliberative Negotiation” in 
Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin, eds, Negotiating Agreement in Politics (Washington, DC: 
American Political Science Association) 86. 
54 MacGinty, supra note 59. 
55 ARK, “Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2017)”, online: Northern Ireland Life and Times 
<https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/>. 
56 The last census was held in 2011 (the next is due in 2021). For details, see: 
https://www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/2011-census-key-statistics-northern-ireland.  
57 A further 2 per cent opted for the “don’t know” option. 
58 A further 2 per cent stated “other.” 
59 A further 12 per cent ticked “would not vote and 10 per cent answered “don’t know.” 
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There is a great deal more that could be said about these data. However, for present 
purposes, the basic point is clear enough. As MacGinty notes, what the Life and 
Times survey suggests is that “constitutional preferences are becoming more diffuse 
and less absolute”.60 But on the other hand, simply asking people whether Northern 
Ireland should be in or out could easily lead to a hardening of constitutional attitudes. 
Far from encouraging people from different groups to discuss the options with an 
open mind, a referendum of this sort might instead serve to (re)polarise opinion. The 
fear of ending up on the losing side might overwhelm the possibility of meaningful 
deliberation, and with it the prospects for moderation. In turn, that might leave 
ordinary people vulnerable to the manoeuvrings of political elites willing to play the 
betrayal card. Under these conditions, the obvious question is why anyone would 
want to hold a referendum—or why it is ever sensible to regard referendum as a 
suitable means of securing consent for democracy? 
 
Towards more deliberative referendums 
 
On the face of it, then, there are at least two major reasons for thinking that 
referendums should be avoided in deeply divided societies: majority domination and a 
solidification of political attitudes. Essentially, both boil down to the claim that 
referendums can have deeply polarising effects in already polarised contexts.  
 
Even so, we should not rush to give up on referendums. For one thing, referendums 
remain the purest form of democracy available to us—other things being equal, direct 
democracy is better than indirect democracy.61 Since democracy means rule by the 
people, referendums give more immediate expression to our standing as political 
equals than indirect forms of participation. But for another, giving up on referendums 
means giving up on certain desirable consequences. As we suggested above, 
referendums can in principle help legitimise a new constitutional settlement by 
securing popular consent for that settlement, encourage ordinary people to take a 
more encompassing view, and improve the prospects for elite moderation and 
compromise (potentially setting in motion a virtuous circle: in turn, elite moderation 
might encourage ordinary people to take a broader view which might foster deeper 
levels of consent). For these reasons alone it is worth persisting with referendums. Yet 
the question is how to improve their performance in practice and, in particular, the 
actual quality of the deliberation that occurs during the referendum campaign. In what 
follows, we suggest the three overlapping areas for consideration—timing, inclusion 
and the structure of the ballots—each of which, as we will indicate, bears directly or 
indirectly on the majoritarian and inflexibility problems discussed above. 
 
Timing 
 
If referendums are held too early, they can easily damage future prospects for 
democracy. They can do so because, at bottom, people will not have had the chance to 
deliberate, to learn a bit more about one another, to trust that the opportunity for 
democracy is real, and, more generally, that others mean what they say. The popular 
rejection of the peace accord signed by the Colombian government and FARC 
guerrillas is a case in point. While the accord was subsequently passed by the 
                                                 
60 MacGinty, supra note 59 at 12.  
61 Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press 2005) 167. 
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Colombian parliament (raising questions of popular consent), many ordinary voters, 
particularly on the government side, simply did not trust the FARC. In particular, 
voters “pointed to previous failed peace negotiations when the rebels took advantage 
of a lull in fighting to regroup and rearm as evidence that the FARC had broken their 
word before.”62 
 
Against this backdrop, it may seem trite to suggest that what both sides needed was 
more time to deliberate. And yet the point remains true: if a referendum is not to be 
perceived simply as a blunt “us against them” event, people will need sufficient time 
to deliberate, before, during and after. Otherwise, there is every danger that 
inflexibility will result—that the referendum will harden attitudes and identities rather 
than broaden attitudes, and reduce the prospects for moderation accordingly. Of 
course, in many cases, people will be hungry for change, and hence may rush 
headlong into a referendum. This puts a somewhat distinctive spin on the most 
familiar charge levelled at referendums (and direct democracy more generally), 
namely that ordinary people lack the necessary skills and knowledge—and that 
because they lack the necessary skills and knowledge, it is better to leave things to 
elites.63 
 
In a curious sort of way, some deliberative democrats seem to connive at this line of 
thought, at least in the sense they have sometimes tended to privilege deliberation 
over consent.64 For example, Chambers argues that “one way to ensure that citizens 
do get distracted by the end game is not to invite them to participate in that game, or 
not directly”.65 By way of example, she cites the case of South Africa, where ordinary 
people were consulted about the 1994 Interim Constitution but not directly involved 
in its ratification; ratification was instead left to the transitional, power-sharing 
government and parliament. Chambers may be right that public consultation can be 
enough to ensure consent; and she may also be right that indirect ratification may take 
the heat out of deep divides. However, as the case of Bosnia shows, indirect 
ratification may have no such effects. Although the Dayton Accords put an end to 
over three years of brutal civil war, indirect ratification has done little to move Bosnia 
much beyond a mere tentative commitment to democratic means. Arguably, the 
problem in Bosnia is not with ordinary people but with the political elite: recent 
electoral behaviour and results suggest that the development of a more effective 
democracy may be as far away as ever.66 In any event, it is hard to see how indirect 
ratification could solve the timing issue—whether direct or indirect, a new democratic 
settlement is as likely to deepen division as not, unless ordinary people have sufficient 
                                                 
62 See BBC online: ‘Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal’ (3 October 2016). Available 
from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37537252. 
63 David Butler & Austin Ranney, “Theory” in David Butler & Austin Ranney, eds, Referendums 
Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) 18 at 18–
19. 
64 The tension between deliberation and equality is explicitly thematised by Fishkin: James S Fishkin, 
Democracy and Deliberation New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991). 
65 Chambers, supra note 46 at 249. 
66 See, e.g. “Milorad Dodik: Serb nationalist wins Bosnia presidency seat”, (8 October 2018), online: 
BBC <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45774872>; Maja Zuvela & Daria Sito-Sucic, 
“Nationalists win in Bosnia, including Serb who opposes ’impossible...”, (8 October 2018), online: 
Reuters <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bosnia-election-idUKKCN1MI1ON>. 
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time to discuss and debate its provisions. Without sufficient time, greater inflexibility 
may well result. 
There are at least two possible solutions here. First, the major provisions of a 
constitutional settlement might be introduced sequentially,67 for example, over a 
period of five years. This would not only allow for sustained deliberation, but would 
also encourage ordinary people to take a broader, more flexible view, freed from the 
zero-sum fear of losing everything in one go. Similarly, introducing major 
constitutional provisions sequentially would not only satisfy the demand for change, 
but would also allow—and indeed encourage—a more sustained examination of the 
claims of political elites, moderate or hard-line.  
 
Secondly, the agreement as a whole might be implemented on a transitional basis 
only, subject to further review at some specified future point. Again, this would 
satisfy the demand for change. But it might also help to avoid what one controversial 
former Québec Premier, Jacques Parizeau, once described as “the lobster trap”: once a 
group or segment votes, its members “would be like lobsters with the trap door 
closing behind them—unable to escape their fate”.68 By removing the fear of finality, 
a transitional agreement might allow ordinary people to be more open, flexible and 
cooperative during the course of a referendum campaign. In short, far from disrupting 
deliberation, voting in a referendum might, if adroitly timed, actually encourage it. 
 
Inclusion 
 
Unlike some other forms of popular participation, referendums usually intervene at 
the end point in a decision-making process.69 As such, they inevitably encourage 
people to think in terms of winners and losers.70 Yet while to some extent this sort of 
thinking may be unavoidable, its worst effects can be mitigated. If a constitutional 
settlement is merely put to the people, majoritarianism may well inhibit deliberation, 
just as MacGinty and others have suggested. However, if the settlement itself 
reflected the views of ordinary people, the starkness of the vote may lose some of its 
intensity. The obvious question is how to solicit those views. 
 
One possible approach is simply to ask people for their views using standard opinion 
polling. There is, however, reason to be wary. In deeply divided societies, concerns 
about security will typically drive people to live within their own communal enclaves, 
to marry within their own religious traditions, to send their children to segregated 
                                                 
67 On sequencing and multi-stage referendums see e.g. Spencer McKay, “Building a Better 
Referendum: Linking Mini-Publics and Mass Publics in Popular Votes” (2019) 15:1 J Public 
Deliberation. 
68 Chambers, supra note 46 at 247. To be sure, Parizeau’s comments on the role of the “ethnic vote” in 
the defeat of the sovereignty referendum in Québec in 1995 are deservedly notorious. 
69 Kriesi & Trechsel, supra note 40 at 56. This is not always so. As the case of South Africa 
demonstrates, referendums can be used early on in the transition to democracy to mandate leaders to 
engage in peace negotiations. For a discussion, see Neophytos Loizides, “Negotiated Settlements and 
Peace Referendums” (2014) 53:2 European J of Political Research 234. However, in this paper we 
confine our remarks to the more standard case. 
70 It is possible to use a referendum to confirm the existence of a consensus. This is how McEvoy reads 
the 1998 referendum on the Belfast Agreement: McEvoy, supra note 24. Even there, however, many in 
the unionist community bitterly opposed the agreement and rejected the referendum result (though 
officials results were not broken down by community, exit polls suggested that the referendum had 
only bare majority support in the unionist community).  
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schools, and so forth. They may therefore go their entire lives without ever engaging 
in a serious conversation with someone from the other side.71 As a result, the chances 
are that their views will not be as balanced or informed as they could potentially be.  
 
But that is not all. If the members of different groups talk only among themselves, 
their deliberations may conform to what Cass Sunstein calls “the law of group 
polarisation”.72 That law refers to a statistical regularity which allows us to predict 
that when like-minded people meet to discuss an issue of importance to them, they 
will move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the median point 
of their prior views and opinions.73 Of course, the mere fact of moving in a more 
extreme direction is neither good nor bad in itself. But if people only engage in 
political discussions with members of their own group, the chances are that they will 
become more entrenched—less flexible or less moderate—in how they hold their 
views.74 Insofar as this occurs, it is hard to see what purpose standard public polling 
might actually serve or why exactly one might want the views of ordinary people to 
shape the referendum proposal. 
 
Fortunately, public consultation need not be reduced to a matter of simply asking 
people for their “off the top of the head” views and opinions. In recent years, many 
jurisdictions have held deliberative forums bringing together people from diverse 
backgrounds to discuss a given set of policy issues .75 The findings from these forums 
are generally encouraging.76 For example, evidence from a “deliberative opinion 
poll,” a specific type of deliberative forum, conducted in Northern Ireland suggests 
that deliberation can help the members of different ethnic groups to see one another in 
a more positive light. Having deliberated together, Catholic participants came to see 
Protestants as trustworthier and more open to reason, while the Protestant participants 
also came to see Catholics as trustworthier (but not more open to reason).77 
 
In a deliberative opinion poll, participants are randomly chosen. As such, deliberative 
opinion polls tend to be highly representative and, in that (statistical) sense, inclusive. 
When we add in the fact that participants usually learn a great deal—changes of 
opinion tend to be information driven—one can plausibly argue that deliberative 
                                                 
71 Michael Billig and Henri Tajfel, ‘Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour’ 
(1973) 3 European Journal of Social Psychology 27; John Coakley, ‘Ethnic Conflict Resolution: 
Routes Towards Settlement’ (2009) 15 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 462, 467. 
72 Sunstein, supra note 15. 
73 Ibid 176. 
74 Cf Kimmo Grönlund, Kaisa Herne & Maija Setälä, “Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions?” 
(2015) 37:4 Political Behavior 995. 
75 See e.g. K Grönlund, A Bächtiger & M Setälä, Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the 
Democratic Process, 272 (ECPR Press, 2014). 
76 Michael X Delli Carpini, Fay L Cook & Lawrence R Jacobs, “Public Deliberation, Discursive 
Participation, and Citizen Engagement: a Review of the Empirical Literature” (2004) 7:1 Annual Rev 
of Political Science 315; Christopher F Karpowitz & Chad Raphael, Deliberation, Democracy, and 
Civic Forums: Improving Equality and Publicity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Ian 
O’Flynn & Gaurav Sood, “What Would Dahl Say? An Appraisal of the Democratic Credentials of 
Deliberative Polls and Other Mini-Publics” in Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger & Maija Setälä, eds, 
Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process, 272 (Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 2014) 41. 
77 Robert C Luskin et al, “Deliberating Across Deep Divides” (2014) 62:1 Political Studies 116. 
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forums of this sort can usefully supplement referendums.78 Of course, deliberative 
forums need to be carefully inserted into the referendum process; they need the 
support of elites from all sides, and their conclusions need to be broadly publicised. 
As yet, we know very little empirically about the conditions under which such support 
might be forthcoming. However, we do know that groups will only begin to think 
about a new constitutional settlement when all sides have reached a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,” that is, when they have each accepted that there is no point in raising the 
stakes any further and that it is time to seek a “way out.”79 Those on the extremes may 
disagree; they may even seek to “spoil” the process.80 As described earlier, 
“outbidding” may become a major problem. But insofar as a mutually hurting 
stalemate creates space for negotiation—and hence for moderation—the moment 
might be “ripe” for public deliberation.81  
 
In principle, therefore, there is reason to think that judiciously timed and placed 
deliberative forums may have an important role to play in overcoming at least some of 
the drawbacks of standard (i.e., non-deliberative) referendums. In particular, they may 
help with the inflexibility problem. Of course, while deliberative forums can have 
their role to play—they provide a picture of what ordinary people from diverse 
backgrounds might conclude under good conditions—they should be viewed as no 
more than one strategy among others designed to promote deliberation during the 
course of a referendum campaign. Greater efforts should also be paid to, for example, 
strengthening civil associations that cut across society and to creating or strengthening 
a pluralised media environment. 
 
Preference ballots  
 
Even so, much can still go wrong unless great care is taken in organising referendums. 
As Chambers notes, in the summer of 1992, a number of deliberative conferences 
were set up across Canada to discuss the need for constitutional change, particularly 
to resolve long-standing disputes between the federal and provincial governments. 
These events were, by all accounts, highly constructive, so much so that many of the 
proposals worked out at these conferences made their way into a formal constitutional 
proposal, the Charlottetown Accord, which was put to the citizens of Canada later that 
year.82 Yet as Chambers goes on to note: 
                                                 
78 In this respect, the Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR), used in Oregon and other US states, is 
instructive. The CIR has been designed to help voters make their judgements on ballot initiative 
questions. Essentially, a randomly selected deliberative forum meets to discuss the topic on the ballot; 
its recommendations are then inserted into the ballot materials that are sent to people’s homes. 
Evidence suggests that voters have quite a lot of trust in the CIR process and that reading the 
recommendations by the CIR increases voters’ awareness and knowledge about the issue at hand: Mark 
E Warren & John Gastil, “Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive Challenges of 
Democratic Citizenship?” (2015) 77:2 The J of Politics 562; James S Fishkin & Robert C Luskin, 
“Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion” (2005) 40:3 Acta 
Politica 284 at 291. 
79 I William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moment” (2001) 
1: 1 The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 8. 
80 Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes” (1997) 22: 2 International Security 5. 
81 I William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond” in Paul C.Stern et al., 
International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 
2000) 225. 
82 Chambers, supra note 46 at 245. 
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The hope of many was that the positive experience of the conferences could be 
recreated at the national level. Since the conferences themselves had a high 
approval rating among citizens at large, this hope did not seem so far fetched. It 
did not, however, pan out. It is not simply that the proposal failed to be ratified, 
for, after all, the conferences could have got it wrong or failed to take into 
account a crucial interest or claim. Another type of disappointment was focused 
on the calibre and tenor of debate. Lacking was the openness and flexibility of 
the conference participants.83 
 
The obvious question is why the quality of debate should have been so much lower—
less open and flexible—among members of the general public than among 
participants in the conferences. There may be any number of possible explanations 
(e.g., time, attention or information asymmetries). Yet according to Chambers, the 
clearest explanation is to be found in the fact that, as the actual referendum 
approached, competing political elites began to prey on the fears of ordinary people. 
In particular, they began to argue that any concession to other interests would be a 
loss for their side.84 Under such conditions, where outbidding was rife and moderation 
was in short supply, it is was hardly surprising that public opinion hardened and the 
people voted no. 
A similar dynamic was also at work in the 1999 Australian Republic Referendum—a 
fundamental constitutional issue that continues to divide Australians. Again, the vote 
was preceded by a period of public consultation. Furthermore, a broadly inclusive 
constitutional convention was assembled to debate the various issues and to propose a 
wording of the referendum question. Just as in the Canadian case, support for a “yes” 
vote was initially strong—opinion polls consistently put support for a republic well 
ahead of retention of the monarchy.85 And yet the referendum failed. Doubtless, in 
this case also, the machinations of political elites must form part of any convincing 
explanation. However, according to Cross, there was a more decisive consideration. 
In no small part, the referendum failed because the option put to the people was not 
the option for which they actually wanted to vote.86 Monarchists seemed to 
successfully sow doubt among republicans about whether the precise model—
appointment of an Australian president by two-thirds of parliament—was the right 
one. Some advertisements warned: “This Republic: don’t risk it” and “If you want to 
vote for the President … Vote No to the Politicians’ Republic”.87 Delegates to the 
constitutional assembly may have had access to superior information and better 
opportunities for deliberation about constitutional options. However, the fact was that 
ordinary people wanted a directly-elected president. Since this option did not appear 
on the ballot, it is hardly surprising that they voted no. 
                                                 
83 Ibid at 245–246. 
84 Ibid at 246–247. 
85 Bernard Cross, “The Australian Republic Referendum, 1999” (2007) 78:4 The Political Quarterly 
556 at 559; Ian McAllister, “Elections Without Cues: The 1999 Australian Republic Referendum” 
(2001) 36:2 Australian Journal of Political Science 247. 
86 Cross, ibid, at 526–564. 
87 George Williams and David Hume, People Power: The History and Future of the Referendum in 
Australia (UNSW Press, 2010) (emphasis in original advertisement). 
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A key option for the reform of referendums, therefore, should be the adoption of 
preferential voting rather than simple majoritarianism. That is, constitutional options 
can be presented to voters in the style of a “preferendum,” which allows voters not 
merely to select a single option, but to rank several reform options (as well as the 
option of retaining the status quo).88 In a preferential vote-counting process, the least 
popular “preferences” (i.e., votes for particular reform options) are removed from the 
running in successive stages, and the next highest choices of voters who favoured 
eliminated preferences are then counted. As preferences are distributed in this way, 
eventually one option accumulates majority support.89 Preferendum voting is a way of 
achieving a majority result despite more than two reform options being on offer. As 
such, its aim is to allow for a more flexible or nuanced expression of voter preference 
and hence to avoid blunt reductionism. Preferential referendum voting is useful 
wherever voters’ preferred options for reform (or for no reform at all) are diverse. We 
saw such circumstances in Australia and (suggestively) in Northern Ireland, above. 
Such diversities of opinion are hardly unusual. Only some constitutional reform 
questions—for instance, certain questions of rights, such as equal rights to marry—
can be reduced easily to “yes”/“no” binaries in a referendum without excluding many 
other possibilities that voters might favour. Constitutional questions of an institutional 
nature—such as the choice of a new model of president, new federal agreement or 
new settlement between peoples in conflict—can raise a particularly kaleidoscopic set 
of voter preferences.90 
We saw above MacGinty’s concern that referendums can distort deliberation by 
neglecting the full range of perspectives lying beyond the (ostensible) single point of 
view of the voter, or beyond two “sides” of a conflict.91 Relatively speaking, 
preferential methods do not oversimplify. Neither, for that matter, do other kinds of 
multi-option referendums.92 But preferential voting likely provides the best 
referendum model because it can present to voters an array of reasonable choices 
(ideally an array selected previously in a trusted, inclusive deliberative forum), while 
as noted still yielding a bottom line majority result.  
That a majority view still prevails is important for the legitimacy of the outcome and 
hence for the issue of democratic consent. There can be some reasonable doubt about 
whether a majority achieved through a preferential ballot is truly a majority. But in 
democracies there are multiple plausible ways of designing voting systems, and none 
                                                 
88 A preferendum allows voters not merely to select a single option, but to rank all of the reform 
options. In the counting process, the least popular option is removed from the running in successive 
stages, and the next highest choices of voters who favoured eliminated options are then counted. As 
votes are distributed in this way, eventually one option accumulates majority support. See Graeme Orr, 
‘Preferenda: the Constitutionality of Multiple Option Referenda’ (2001) 3(4) Constitutional Law and 
Policy Review 68.  
89 Graeme Orr, ‘Preferenda: the Constitutionality of Multiple Option Referenda’ (2001) 3(4) 
Constitutional Law and Policy Review 68. 
90 Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process (Gill & Macmillan 2001) 7–9 (recounting 
the myriad constitutional options considered for Northern Ireland in the decades before the Belfast 
Agreement and referendum). 
91 MacGinty, supra note 59. 
92 For instance, voters might first be asked to choose whether reform should occur at all—a “yes” or 
“no” proposition—before being asked to choose among several specific options. After a “yes” vote, the 
specific option receiving a plurality, but not necessarily a majority, of votes would prevail. 
 
 22 
 
is necessarily superior to all others.93 Run-off voting, including preferential (i.e., 
“instant run-off”) voting, is already widely practiced in elections for public office 
around the world. As Williams and Hume write, “No one thinks it is problematic that 
general elections give voters a range of choices; why should it be different for 
referendums?”94 
 
There seems to be no principled reason why, then, if a majority vote derived through 
preferential voting is legitimate for elections, it should not also be legitimate for 
referendums. Preferential voting indeed potentially improves consent. It may be a 
solution to the problem that, where voters have diverse preferences, running the 
referendum in a binary “yes”/“no” mode often guarantees that the referendum reflects 
the views of just one voter group—those who favour the status quo.95 The standard, 
unreconstructed referendum has an institutional bias in favour of this group of voters, 
who may be neither the majority nor even the largest minority. Yet it may be possible 
to update the referendum, using modern methods such as those we have outlined, to 
enhance—at least incrementally—both choice and deliberativeness in the referendum. 
Pace Chambers and MacGinty, a referendum that seeks to accommodate a diversity 
of views may avoid corralling voters; it may open up space for deliberation rather 
than closing it down. And it may do so even in a deeply divided society. At the very 
least, there is every reason to try. 
 
Conclusion 
There are several lessons from our discussion of options for redesigning referendums, 
and of the deliberative challenges that these options seek to address. First, public 
consultation is a tricky business. In particular, careful attention has to be paid not just 
to the findings of deliberative polls and the like, but also to the views and opinions of 
the vast majority of people who will never participate in such forums. Secondly, 
although some deliberative democrats argue that political elites are better placed to 
deliberate than ordinary people, a new constitutional settlement may not be 
considered legitimate unless non-elites have their say—or their chance to signal their 
consent. But non-elites may not be able to have their say unless efforts are made to 
discourage political elites from playing the betrayal card. Finally, the choice that is 
put to the people must be a meaningful choice. As we have argued, binary choices not 
only fail to capture the complexity of constitutional issues, but will almost always 
discount important aspects of popular opinion. So, while timing and public 
consultation are crucial issues, the structure of the ballot also deserves weighty 
consideration. In principle, there is no reason why a referendum question must be 
posed in starkly reductive terms. Just as many countries use a preferential ballot 
structure for general elections, there is no reason why they should not also use a 
preferential ballot structure in referendums. 
 
If referendums are not carefully designed and conducted so as to promote moderation, 
they may undermine deliberation and hence undermine one of the necessary or 
principal conditions of their own success. Naturally, there is no suggestion here that 
referendums can solve all the ills that deeply divided societies face or that democracy 
                                                 
93 Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of 
Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).. 
94 Williams and Hume, supra note 98 at 258. 
95 Ibid at 257-258. 
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can be reduced to referendums. Yet, if skilfully and sensitively designed, they can 
play a crucial role, so long, that is, as ordinary people are made to feel that their views 
for something in the process. If, on the other hand, they are made to feel that their 
opinions count for nothing, they may, with good reason, withhold their consent, with 
all the ramifications that that may have for any new democratic settlement.  
